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A common place in the interpretation of Hegel's political philosophy is that it 
contains powerful criticisms of liberal individualism and advances strongly 
institutionalist proposals.2 My aim in this essay is not to contribute directly to 
this discussion. Rather I want to examine Hegel's analysis of the category of 
'individual' in the Science of Logic. Getting to grips with the logic of 
'individual' is important in helping us make sense both of his criticism of the 
politics of individualism, discussed at length in the literature, and his 
recognition of the positive, liberating function of modern individualism.	  	  
What the discussion in the Logic shows is that there are two ways of 
understanding the category of 'individual' the first of which Hegel's argument 
undermines, the second it preserves. The one he undermines is the conception 
of 'individual' understood as something that counts as one by virtue of not 
being reducible to something else. This sense of individual comes very close 
to what modern metaphysicians call a ‘simple’, which is whatever is taken as 
basic in our discussions about the world.3 If we look at contemporary moral 
and political philosophy, we will have no difficulty in finding examples of 
this use of 'individual'. References to the cognitive and volitional powers of 
individuals, their practical skills, level of epistemic competence, rights, self-
expression, want-satisfaction, preferences and so on, presuppose that we use 
'individual' to mean something that counts as one by virtue of not being 
reducible to something else. The substantive moral and political claims 
advanced on behalf of individuals, so understood, can, of course, be criticised 
without recourse to logical arguments, Hegel's or anyone else's.4 Our task 
here, however, is not to argue for or against substantive positions in politics 
or ethics. Rather it is the more modest one of understanding Hegel's own 
views. The advantage of going about it through the Logic is that his criticisms 
of the political manifestations of these simples are shown to be not mere 
correctives of individualism, they are an invitation to rethink systematically 
what we mean by 'individual', what we care about politically, and who in 
each case is the 'we' who undertake such critical reflection on our words and 
on our aspirations.  
 
I just said that there is a second way of understanding 'individual' that 
Hegel's argument preserves. If we look in the literature on Hegel's social and 
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political philosophy, however, we do not find such a notion; we find attention 
focused on his positive arguments about interpersonal relations, such as 
recognition, and the practices and institutions of ethical life. The notion of 
individual presupposed in these discussions is the notion of the simple 
outlines above and this is what gives rise to the usual conundrum about how 
Hegel can strike a balance between 'the individual' and 'the social'.5 A rare 
exception is Kenneth Westphal who comes up with a positive definition of 
individuality summarised in three theses that make up what he calls 
'moderate collectivism': 
 
MC1. Individuals are social practitioners. Everything a person 
does, says, or thinks is formed in the context of social practices 
that provide material and conceptual resources, objects of 
desire, skills, procedures, techniques, and occasions and 
permissions for action et cetera.  
MC2. What individuals do depends on their own response to 
their social and natural environment. 
MC3. There are no individuals, no social practitioners, without 
social practices and vice versa no social practices without social 
practitioners, individuals who learn, participate in, perpetuate, 
and who modify those social practices as needed to meet their 
changing needs, aims, and circumstances (including procedures 
and information). (Westphal 2003: 107 emphasis in the original) 
 
These three theses do not appear to be making excessive philosophical 
demands of the sort that would warrant a re-conception of the category of 
individual.6 Moderate collectivism is a readily graspable view about the ways 
we form and are formed by our environment and is routinely assumed in 
disciplines such as social anthropology or political economy. What I want to 
show, however, is that for Hegel to think consistently in this fashion requires 
that we give up on the unitary conception of individual and replace it with 
one that is quite a bit more demanding than the moderate theses Westphal 
attributes to Hegel. Hegel's alternative to the unitary conception is one in 
which ‘individual’ is an incomplete term: in order to fully characterise what 
makes someone an individual, further information must be adduced. Hegel's 
logical revision of the category of 'individual' supports Westphal's analysis of 
moderate collectivism while at the same time presents us with an open 
question concerning the complete specification of any given individual, a 
question, which, I want to argue, has important practical implications.  
 
Section 1 examines the material from the Logic and substantiates the claims 
made in this introductory section about Hegel's criticism of the unitary 
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conception of individual. His positive conception remains however puzzling. 
Section 2 uses the resources of an argument by Peter Geach to help with this. 
Section 3 shows how the logical arguments map onto practical arguments. 
Section 4 returns to Westphal's moderate collectivism and draws some 
tentative conclusions about the relation between logic and politics. 
 
 
1. ‘Posited abstraction’: the category of 'individual' in the Logic  
 
Hegel treats the logical category of ‘individual’ (das Einzelne) in the second 
and final volume of the Science of Logic entitled ‘Subjective Logic or the 
Doctrine of the Notion’. The volume has three sections, 'Subjectivity', which is 
where the discussion of 'The Individual' is located, 'Objectivity' and 'The 
Idea', which concludes the whole book. 
 
Under ‘Subjective Logic’ Hegel treats mainly, though not exclusively, certain 
aspects of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. The introduction to this volume, 
entitled 'The Notion in general', contains a detailed discussion of Kant's 
transcendental deduction from the first Critique. Given the prominence of this 
discussion, it is plausible to think that the whole volume on 'Subjective Logic' 
is concerned with the subjectivity of the synthetic unity of apperception or 'I', 
which Hegel also calls a 'unity of consciousness' (L 584, 6:254) and the 
conceptual nature of its synthesis, which allows Hegel to refer to the thinking 
activity of this 'I' as the 'Notion' (Begriff). Hegel credits Kant with the 
categorial expression of the unifying function of the 'I': 
 
It is one of the profoundest and truest insights to be found in the 
Critique of Pure Reason that the unity which constitutes the nature 
[Wesen] of the Notion is recognized as the original synthetic unity of 
apperception, as unity of the I think, or of self-consciousness (L 584, 
6:254) 
 
The purpose of this introductory discussion is to set out the problem the 
second volume aims to resolve, namely to uncover the nature of the Notion, 
'what the Notion is' (L 585, 6:255). The question arises for Hegel because Kant 
does not fully explain how the thinking activity of the I can truly be thought 
as ground of all objectivity. Having acknowledged Kant's contribution then, 
Hegel aims to show that this Kantian inheritance needs revision and 
extension. 7  He argues that in order to grasp the I’s unifying function, 
precisely so as to account for the ‘unity of the Notion and reality’ (L 587, 
6:258), neither the (Kantian) categories of the understanding nor the mere 
thought of the 'I' can help. This is where he introduces what he calls ‘the Idea’ 
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(ibid.), which is a concept that represents or expresses 'the unity of Notion 
and reality'.8 These general introductory remarks on 'The Notion in General' 
give us not just the context of the whole volume, but also of the chapter that 
immediately follows, on 'The Notion', which ends with a discussion of 'The 
Individual'. Prior to this discussion, however, Hegel makes some puzzling 
remarks in which he attributes individuality to the ‘Notion’. I will therefore 
examine first this material and then turn to the explicit treatment of the 
category of the individual.  
 
Hegel attributes individuality to the notion in the course of his critical 
engagement with Kant. He starts the section by identifying the limitations of 
Spinoza's conception of substance as lacking a unity that is manifest. I take 
this to mean that the unity of Spinozan substance is just given. 9  The 
requirement for such unity to be unmysterious to thought is what moves the 
argument forward and brings the 'Notion' properly into the discussion. By 
means of this move, Hegel introduces the 'Notion' qua transcendental unity of 
apperception and the whole Kantian thematic of the volume. It is in this 
context that he makes the claim that 'the Notion is the individual’ (L 582, 
6:252). He then explains the claim as follows: the identity of the Notion has 
‘the determination of negativity’, which in turn, gives us the ‘Notion of the 
Notion’ (L 582, 6:252). These claims appear very opaque; one way of 
understanding what Hegel is saying here is by taking them as a Hegelian 
summary of an argument that can be found in Kant and which states that the 
notion (Notio) (A320) of transcendental subjectivity ‘is known only through 
the thoughts that are its predicates’ (Kant 1999: A346/ B404), i.e. it is not 
known in itself. So in Hegel’s terms it is a ‘negatively’ determined individual. 
At the same time, Hegel says, the Notion is also a universal. This is again a 
difficult claim to understand not least because Hegel has not yet explained 
what theory of universals he espouses. But from the negative determination 
the plausible conclusion can be  drawn that the Notion is not a substance and 
also not a universally distributed particular. So at this stage ‘universal’ can at 
most mean a class to which all particular acts of unification of the manifold 
belong. This is another way of trying to say that the Notion is a necessary 
principle of all cognition by every subject of cognition. So the Notion 
(understood still as the transcendental ‘I’) possesses universality and an 
individual identity that is to be conceived of negatively. Given the specificity 
of the context of the discussion of the individuality of the Notion, it would 
seem unlikely that we can draw any conclusions besides those relating to 
Hegel’s interpretation of Kant. However there is something interesting going 
on here that has broader relevance to his conception of ‘individual’ as such. In 
attempting to convey more precisely the identity of the ‘I’, Hegel describes it 
as ‘self-related negativity’ that has individuality in the sense of ‘opposing 
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itself to all that is other and excluding it’ and which is individuated ‘through 
its unity with the positedness’ that constitutes the ‘nature of the I as well as of 
the Notion’ (L 583 emphasis added, 6:252). The basic description of the 
individuality of the ‘I’ is given precisely in terms of what we called previously 
the standard modern view, as ‘opposing itself to all that is other and 
excluding it’, its individuation, however, is presented as something that is not 
a straightforward matter. Rather what makes something the individual it is 
has to do with its ‘positedness’, so individuation is a sort of relation that 
reveals the nature of the thing as individual such and such. It is in this 
manner, Hegel concludes that the concept of ‘individual’ gains ‘concreteness’ 
(L 603, 6:277). 
 
With this in the background, let us now turn to the section on ‘The 
Individual’. 10  The argument repeats the basic moves we found in the 
discussion of the individuality of the Notion adding detail and clarifying the 
structure of the presentation: we start basically with what seems to be an easy 
and unproblematic way of picking out individuals and then Hegel points out 
that the ‘individual’ is not thereby determined and that determination 
requires at least two relata. The first move is to describe individuality 
partially as what is involved when we identify something specific, a 
particular, a ‘this ...’ (L 618, 6:296). This identification is ‘illusory’ Hegel 
claims. This basic understanding of individuality makes it ‘an illusory being 
within the universal’ (L 619, 6:297). The idea seems to be that in seeking to 
determine that which is individual, we resort to features that are general, we 
seek to determine it ‘through abstraction which lets drop the particular and 
rises to the higher and the highest genus’ (L 619, 6:297). This abstraction, 
Hegel notes, ‘is a sundering of the concrete and an isolating of its 
determinations; through it only single properties and moments are seized’ (L 
619, 6:297). So what is individual then? Hegel wants to hold onto to the idea 
of its connection to the original ‘this’ of particularity and also to the 
abstraction or formality of universality. His designation of individuality is 
‘posited abstraction’ (L 621 and 622, 6:299 and 300). I want to suggest that we 
understand this designation as an invitation to consider fully determined 
individuality as a unity of form (the universality) and a substantive or 
‘concrete’ element (the particular). 
 
How is individuality to be fully determined though? The clue to answering 
this question is in the structure of the section on Subjectivity. On the one 
hand, we have an analysis of subjectivity as a concept that has a very 
distinctive nature, it is a unifying concept (the Notion) and as such it is an 
individual, in the sense of an 'I'. On the other hand, 'individual' is one 
element, together with 'universal' and 'particular', in the forms of thought 
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about reality. At the end of the discussion of individuality we do not have a 
full determination of it either as a form of thought nor as an 'I' and the reason 
for this is that Hegel has not yet discussed judgement, which on Kantian 
grounds, is the basic unit of cognition. To determine something fully is a 
matter of a special kind of judgement that gives us just what the thing is; 
Hegel calls this 'essential determination [Wesentlichkeit]' (L 643, 6:326). 
Judgement for Hegel is both an 'original partition' (L 622, 6:301 and 628, 6:304) 
and a unity, bringing together subjects, 'this' or what something 'simply is [das 
Seiende] or is for itself' (L 627, 6:306) with predicates that signify something 
universal (ibid.). Using traditional subject-predicate logic, Hegel seeks to 
show that the basic form of thought in which a genus or universal is 
predicated of something aims at something that is not quite captured in the 
judgement form. To say truly of x that it is y, requires a certain agility in 
thinking that the universality of the x is concrete and the particularity of the y 
is an 'invidualised universal' (L 662, 6:349). Hence, Hegel says, 'we have 
before us the determinate and fullfilled [erfüllte] copula, which formerly 
consisted in the abstract 'is'' (L 662, 6:350). The emphasis on the unity 
achieved through this new perspective on the copula or the judgement 
function, 'S is p', Hegel says, amounts to a step forward from judgement to 
syllogism (L 663, 6:351). While I am not going to follow Hegel's argument 
here, except to note that the move to syllogism is pivotal for the transition 
from the section on Subjectivity to that on Objectivity, it is clear from the 
material we covered so far that the direction of argument about the categories 
that Hegel puts in the section on Subjectivity is towards forms of thought that 
permit gathering together single elements of thought into systematic wholes 
in which these elements signify by virtue of the role they play in the bigger 
whole.11  
 
So given this context how is individuality determined? Or in other words, 
what is Hegel's positive theory? And following from this: can a positive 
theory of individuality be extracted without committing to every claim 
contained in the Logic? Taking each question in turn: first in some sense 
individuality cannot be fully determined without losing its individual 
character, that is to say, we have to acknowledge what, especially in the 
Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel designates as the 'negative' character of individuality 
(see §163 and §165). At the same time, a positive theory can be extracted given 
that individuals are determinable in judgements. In what follows, I will make 
a sideways step that can help extract such a positive theory from the material 
Hegel has given us in the Logic. The step is sideways because it does not treat 
Hegel's arguments but Geach's reconstruction of the Aquinian conception of 
'form'. While this interpretative path may look unpromising, rendering the 
obscure yet more obscure, I believe that Geach's ‘thin’ –i.e. guided by logico-
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linguistic concerns- reconstruction of Aquinas’s argument, can help us 
advance our understanding on Hegel's the positive theory of individuality. 
 
 
 
 
2. A hunch about form: Geach on Aquinas  
 
Hegel's Science of Logic is both about basic categories of thought, that is, how 
we think or philosophers have thought about what there is, and about what 
there is. This ambition of considering thought and being in a single project 
can seem very remote from the logico-linguistic concerns of the tradition we 
are about to discuss. However, as we shall see, one of Geach's motivations for 
getting predication right is that it saves us from being metaphysically misled. 
Of particular interest and relevance to our current concerns is Geach's 
discussion of form in Aquinas. I want to suggest that Hegel's positive theory 
of the category of individual can be illuminated if we think of 'individual' as a 
'form' in the manner Geach explains. The key advantage of understanding 
‘individual’ as form is that we do not need to replace the concept with some 
other, all that is needed is to reflect more deeply about the conceptual 
commitments we incur in using the term. Admittedly drawing on medieval 
arguments recast in response to post-Fregean logico-linguistic concerns is a 
rather roundabout way of making sense of the category of Hegel’s individual 
especially of its positive content. However, neither the thirteenth nor the early 
twentieth century aspects need intrude. My aim is not to engage in scholarly 
debate about Aquinas, nor to champion a specific position in the philosophy 
of language, rather it is to show how Geach’s interpretation of ‘form’ is very 
fruitful when applied to Hegel’s conception of the individual.12  
 
Geach's work aims to show that the formal analysis of language undertaken 
by logicians has an important role in clarifying our everyday use of language, 
and this purpose can be served by drawing on both medieval and Fregean 
theories of logic and language.13 The particular argument that concerns us 
here on Aquinas's notion of form is a perfect example of this approach. 
Geach’s interpretation of form takes its cue from Frege’s notion of a concept 
(Begriff). Frege delimits sharply between concepts and objects assigning to 
them different logical roles. One way of putting this by means of an example, 
is to say ‘Socrates is a man’ our thought can be divided into two constituents, 
the object-expression ‘Socrates’ and of the concept-expression ‘is a man’. On 
Geach’s interpretation, Aquinas’s notion of ‘form’ falls on the concept side of 
the distinction; what falls on the other side is what Aquinas calls the supposit, 
which he uses to designate a complete entity. 14  
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This does not take us very far because it is not really clear what forms are. 
Geach illustrates the meaning of ‘form’ with Aquinas’s example ‘quo albedus 
Socrates est’, ‘that by which Socrates is white’; what interests us is the phrase 
introduced by quo because this is what designates the form function. It is 
useful here to consider how one might say otherwise ‘that by which Socrates 
is white’ given how odd it sounds to contemporary ears. A synonymous 
expression, Geach claims, is ‘albedo Socratis’, or ‘the whiteness of Socrates’ 
(Geach 1955: 5).  
 
Although Geach's clarification enables us to recognise form expressions 
without the use of the cumbersome quo, it leaves us in the dark about their 
role. One may ask for example, why should a contemporary audience, which 
is not especially interested in the history of philosophy, spend time 
considering ‘that by which...’ expressions. The contemporary philosopher 
may argue that she has to hand an accepted theory about subjects and 
predicates, according to which, as Geach himself reminds his audience, the 
logical subject and predicate have different ways of signifying. Another way 
of putting this concern is why can't we absorb ‘that by which X is y’ 
expressions into ‘X is y’ expressions? The reason Geach gives, and the 
motivation for focusing on Aquinas, is that he wants to add something 
controversial to the accepted theory, namely that the ‘realities signified’ 
(Geach 1955: 5) are not different in type. This is what thinking about forms 
contributes to the debate; it allows us to think of ‘realities signified’ without 
committing ourselves to the search of a thing, such as ‘whiteness’ – a form in 
the Platonic sense- which would then lead us to a confused search of how 
Socrates partakes of whiteness or how whiteness belongs to Socrates.  
 
Although Geach is making his argument in the context of Anglophone post-
Fregean philosophy of language, the point he makes about predication and 
how we think about the ontological basis of what we say is clearly of much 
broader application. Another way of talking about Aquinian forms is to say 
that the attributes of the particulars we are talking about, the 'whiteness' of 
Socrates, for example, are themselves particulars -not Platonic forms.15  This 
view, popularised in contemporary metaphysics in the discussion of 'tropes', 
speaks to the intuition that the whiteness of Socrates is a different whiteness 
to the whiteness of his chiton or the whiteness of his eye. To return to the 
Aquinian terminology Geach uses to make his point, the idea that a supposit 
relates to form by being an instance of something, e.g. 'here is Socrates' and 
'here is something white', and something recognisable as such, e.g. 'this here 
Socrates is such and such'. By contrast, form signifies by enabling us to focus 
on the kind of thing something is, the kind of designation that is applicable to 
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the thing. The important point is that forms direct us to look what in the 
world they signify. ‘Forms’, Geach says, ‘are what answer in rebus to logical 
predicates’ (Geach 1955: 6). So he recommends that we should allow that 
‘logical predicates stand for something, as well as being true or false of things’ 
(Geach 1955: 6). It is this idea of ‘standing for something’ that makes the 
Aquinian notion of form especially interesting in the Hegelian context.  
 
How does Aquinas’s concept of form allow us to think of the realities the 
logical predicates stand for? Let us go back to ‘the whiteness of Socrates’. The 
claim is that this phrase stands for something and at the same time that 
‘whiteness’ does not stands for a substance –or what amounts to the same 
thing that ‘whiteness’ is not a subject. Geach’s answer is to point out first of 
all that ‘whiteness’ is of no use to anyone. What we in fact say is ‘the 
(whiteness) of …’. If we take this as the Aquinian form, rather than the 
abstract term ‘whiteness’, we see that ‘the X of …’ is not complete, ‘it needs to 
be completed with a name of something that has the form’ (Geach 1955: 5). So 
we treat ‘the whiteness of …’ in exactly the same fashion as the predicate ‘… 
is white’, which also needs to be completed by a subject (ibid.). Aquinian 
form, whether in the phrase using the abstract term ‘the Xness of …’ or the 
predicate phrase ‘… is x’, is in Fregean terms ‘unsaturated’. The ‘of’ in the first 
phrase is a ‘logically inseparable part’ of the phrase indicating ‘the need to 
put a name after this sign’ (ibid.). Here, as Geach notes, we have to tread 
carefully or we shall lose the distinction between form and logical individual. 
Form simpliciter is the reference of the predicate ‘…is white’, form 
characterised or made specific is the reference of a phrase such as ‘the 
whiteness of Socrates’. So we understand the original ‘quo’ as a way of 
connecting a logical individual with some form, in the familiar manner of 
subject/predicate, but also as distinguishing the individual from its 
individualized forms, so we speak of Socrates and also his whiteness, 
wisdom, humanity etc, and similarly we can say of the whiteness of Socrates 
that it is off-putting, and of the whiteness of Alcibiades that it is attractive, etc. 
 
Let us see now how this discussion can help us with a positive theory of 
Hegelian 'individual' as a concept that we may use in ordinary discussions. 
Hegel as we saw repeatedly refers to the individual as a 'this' (L 621, 622, 
6:300), which naturally fits the position of supposit in our previous analysis: 
'here is x' 'here is something y'. But it is precisely such a use that Hegel calls 
illusory. If we don't think of individual as a this, or at least if we entertain the 
thought that such a conception of the individual is in some way problematic, 
we will not be tempted to give metaphysical sustenance to the 'this' by 
considering the individual as a simple. The alternative that Hegel gives us in 
the Logic is to think of 'individual' as a 'posited abstraction', which in light of 
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the arguments from Geach just discussed, we can understand to mean that 
the term is asserted but it is not complete.  
 
To put the same thing more simply to assert that someone is an individual, as 
in ‘…is an individual’ and ‘the individuality of …’ is to say something that is 
in need of completion. Replacing the unitary conception of ‘individual’ with 
this revised conception in which individual is a form has the advantage of 
leaving open the term to admit the further information of the kind we seek. 
To say '...is an individual' sounds a lot less informative than '...is white'. But 
they are different forms and different realities signified when we speak of the 
whiteness of Socrates or the whiteness of his chiton. Similarly when we are 
thinking of the form '...is an individual' we ought to concern ourselves with 
the realities signified and ask about what fills that in, what characterises that 
form. So if we say 'Mary is an individual' we may mean she has manners that 
somehow mark her out in a specific context, the how and the what of the 
context further serve to characterise the form. But we may also mean that she 
is a being capable of choice and that she can make up her own mind about 
something. In each case we mean something and something is understood 
depending on the filling we put to the form. Also in each case, if there is 
doubt, more questions can be asked, such as, what instances of dress count as 
distinctive, what behaviour we identify as distinctive, what transactions show 
capacity of choice. Discussion concerns concrete instances either of particular 
things ('this email here') or of further forms (‘…is thoughtful’).  
 
The advantage of thinking of Hegel's positive theory of the category of the 
individual in terms of a form that needs specification is that we can think of 
individuals and objective spirit as being on the same side, so to speak, to the 
extent that the individualized form of ‘individual’ stands for some portion of 
reality, or in more Hegelian terms, some portion of spirit. By 'spirit' I 
understand here both 'subjective spirit', the whole range of states of mind we 
display in interacting with our environment, including our social 
environment, and 'objective spirit', the roles we occupy in institutional 
settings within organised social and political wholes. When we seek to 
characterise the portion of spirit we pick out with the term ‘individual’, we 
commit ourselves to referring to worldly specifics. As Hegel puts it in the 
Logic, seeking to clarify the idea of posited abstraction, ‘the this is; it is 
immediate; but it is only this in so far as it is pointed out’ (L 622, 6:300).16 In 
each case, we are effortlessly referred to the world and specific encounters in 
the world to substantiate, explain, clarify what we say. Neither individuals 
nor individuality disappear in this way, rather we are directed to consider 
what they stand for. 
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3. Individuals in practice 
 
The position defended in the previous two sections comes to this: to say that 
someone is an individual is to say something though not very much unless 
there is further information available that helps us specify, individualise, the 
individual in question. This is not a matter of the pragmatics of conversations, 
of filling in missing information by knowing something about the context. For 
Hegel, it is a matter of the logic of individuality. The category 'individual' 
signifies through being completed, fully determined. The purpose of the 
present section is to find out what such full determination amounts to. In part 
making the 'individual' complete requires an extended description of social, 
political, and also cultural properties, which make the practical individual a 
region of spirit. In addition, however, the high degree of historical specificity 
Hegel assumes in his treatment of individuality allows him to incorporate in 
his discussion the different philosophical contents provided by empiricist and 
Kantian conceptions of individuality. So the specification of 'individual' is not 
just fulfilled through positive identification of roles, choices, interests, but also 
through reference to aspirations that attach to modern conceptions of 
individuality associated with assertion of the right to self-determination, non-
interference by others, but also the universalist aspirations that come with a 
moral self-conception of individuals. The upshot, I want to argue, is a 
dynamic practical conception of individuality.  
 
Before we concern ourselves with the fulfilled or completed individual, it is 
important to rehearse some of the criticisms of individualism we find 
consistently in Hegel and which are underpinned by the criticism of the 
unitary conception of individual. Already in his early work, the so-called 
'Theological Writings' dating the mid-1790s and including the Jena period 
writings of the early 1800s, Hegel was centrally concerned with articulating a 
positive conception of freedom, a conception that is 'positive' in the sense that 
it contains substantive commitments that express or constitute human 
freedom. 17  Integral to this project is Hegel's criticism of individualistic 
conceptions of freedom, on the grounds that they are merely negative and 
thus cannot find genuine expression in specific practical commitments (cf. NL 
66, 2:448-9), or, alternatively, because they are concerned with the availability 
of alternatives, to do or to refrain from doing, which Hegel considers vacuous 
(cf. NL 89f, 2:477f). The clearest example of such arguments can be found in 
the 'Natural Law' essay, Hegel takes issue explicitly with empiricist and 
idealist conceptions of freedom- these last represented by Kant and Fichte. 
The empiricist ones are paradigmatically negative on Hegel's presentation 
and advocate non-interference with individual choices while they are 
unconcerned about offering a normatively convincing conception of the 
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individual in question. This conception of individual, individual in substance, 
as Frederick Neuhouser calls it, is central to empiricist contract theories, 
which assume an instrumental gain from participation in the state (see 
Neuhouser 2000: 182). The idealist conceptions by contrast supply this 
normative conception, the individual as moral agent, but ground it in a notion 
of spontaneity that remains mysterious. This empiricist and idealist 
inheritance in thinking about freedom and individuals is submitted to a more 
nuanced and thorough critical discussion in the Phenomenology. Importantly 
for our purposes, in this work, as Robert Pippin argues, Hegel's 'critique of 
the ultimacy of individuality' (Pippin 2006: 135) takes in the very model of 
mind presupposed by individualist conceptions of agency, which in turn 
underpin individualist conceptions of freedom. Pippin argues against a 
model that assumes that the inner has primacy over the outer and seeks to 
show that we are agents only insofar as we are also members of a social world 
that allows us to have and make sense of intentions, interests, and aims.18 To 
summarise then we have a set of positive claims about individuals qua 
members of a social world, but also a philosophical inheritance of 
individualism in connection with freedom that is certainly criticised but also 
presupposed in Hegel's positive argument. How these elements fit together is 
what I want to examine next. 
 
Let us start with a text that appears to support an extreme form of 
collectivism, with little evidence of the moderation Westphal advises. In the 
Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Hegel describes the relation of 
members of the state to the whole in which they belong as follows: 
 
The living reality of the state within its individual members is what we 
have called its ethical life. The state and its laws and institutions belong 
to these individuals; they enjoy their rights within it, and they have 
their external possessions within its nature, its soil, its mountains, its 
air, and its waters, for it is their land, their fatherland. The history of 
their state, its deeds and the deeds of their forefathers, are theirs too ... 
for it is their substance and being (Wesen) (LPH 102-3, 12: 123). 
 
Hegel describes here what he later summarises as the 'spiritual being' -or 
'essence'- of the individual (LPH 103, 12:124 ). This is a statement of fact of 
how things stand with individuals considered as members of ethical life. At 
its most comprehensive, ethical life extends to encompass the 'spirit of the 
nation' (ibid.) and so not just the laws and practices of the present, but also 
the history of the state and the natural environment it encloses within its 
boundaries. This discussion easily fits an organic view of ethical life where all 
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that matters is the collectivity and the shared 'spiritual being' that makes the 
'living reality' of the state.  
 
Note however that the context, a discussion of world history, may not be 
ideally suited for providing us with a view of the inner articulation of ethical 
life. Indeed if we turn to the Philosophy of Right, a work that does grapple with 
this issue, we find that, to begin with, not every item in the quoted list above 
makes equally authoritative claims in the lives of the members of ethical life. 
Hegel argues that it is the 'ethical substance', the laws and powers that 
regulate the lives of individuals not their natural environment (PR §§145-6). 
This ethical substance, in turn, is a highly organised whole in which different 
spheres of activity are sustained by a range of institutions and are defined by 
distinct roles that make up the worldly specifics of individuals and thereby 
give us their being (or 'essence' see PR §147). So members of ethical life are 
very finely characterised as family members, members of particular estates, 
classes and so on. These contents have normative weight: to be a son, a 
citizen, and a farmer is to be under certain obligations, there are certain things 
you have to do, they are marked out as the 'rules of his own situation' (PR 
§150 A). The conformity of the individual 'with the duties of the station to 
which he belongs' (PR §150) appears as a 'second nature' (PR §151). That 
Hegel describes second nature as an attainment indicates that whatever the 
facts of membership in Sittlichkeit the induction into ethical substance is not 
spontaneous. On the contrary it requires a process whereby the 'self-will of 
the individual' vanishes 'together with his private conscience which had 
claimed independence and opposed itself to ethical substance' (PR §152). 
Ultimately it is the 'individuality of the state' (PR §325) that takes precedence 
over particular individualities and it is duty to this political whole that ties 
members of the state together (ibid.).19  
 
Let us now take stock. The emphasis Hegel places on belonging, on being a 
member of a larger organised whole, fits with a classical view of what we 
may call 'embedded' values, one understands values and value-based 
demands by virtue of belonging to particular organised communities and 
having certain roles in these communities. This view is consistent with the 
logic of individuals we discussed in the previous sections. This is because 
'individuals' can be spoken about as segments of spirit. If we look at the 
Encyclopedia Philosophy of Mind and the consecutive layers of 'mind' (Geist), or 
elements of subjective and objective spirit, which Hegel discusses there, it 
becomes clear that specification of individuals spans anything from physical 
soul to ethical substance to the their moral and religious life. The content of 
the specified individual is given by propositions that are very fine-grained, 
giving us the physical as well as moral, social, political, religious properties of 
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the being in question; they are individual because not despite of the multi-
layered spiritual being that defines them. Another way of putting this is that 
the term has use by directing us to the specifics, without spirit, which allows 
for the extended descriptions that specify the individual and her 
individuality, 'individual' is an abstraction 'devoid of life, colour and filling' 
(L 619, 6:297). 
 
The question now then is whether there is any further content to 'individual' 
that allows us to square the classical view of embedded value with claims 
such as 'the individual's destiny is the living of a universal life' (PR §258A). 
Leaving behind the world-historical perspective may well have allowed us to 
pin down regions of spirit that identify individuals and set out the things that 
count for them as authoritative and make them the individuals they are, but 
such identification of individuals for the purposes of referring to them 
properly is cold comfort to those who fear that it also requires that 
individuals fully identify with the region of spirit they are. As many 
commentators have argued, Hegel is not advocating blind adherence to 
whatever ethical substance one is born into.20 He insists on the rational 
relation of individual and her environment, a rationality guided by 
considerations of freedom; the individual finds her aspirations for freedom 
fulfilled in the rational state. If we take this strand of Hegel's argument 
seriously, we need to consider also the historical and conceptual inheritance 
of 'individual'. There is spiritual content, in other words, that refers us back to 
empiricist and idealist conceptions of individuality. While Hegel is critical of 
them, he does not deny that they have taken root in our thinking and more 
than that, he recognises that they express aspects of who we, now, are and 
aspire to be.21 Hegel is a historical thinker, which, in this context, means that 
he appropriates and seeks to integrate the modern normative and 
psychological content of 'individual', despite the atomistic presuppositions of 
such content.22 Such integration, in the Philosophy of Right, takes the form of a 
philosophical re-description of what is 'actual' so as to correct these atomistic 
presuppositions to fit something like what Westphal describes as moderate 
collectivism.   
 
One problem with the moderate collectivist theses is they are very weak and 
simply direct us to attend to the context in which individuals form what they 
say and do, learn, become who they are and in turn transform. We can 
supplement them with what Neuhouser calls methodological atomism, which 
permits references to interests at the atomic level, but does not stand in the 
way of formation of shared interests and the non-instrumental participation 
in a social whole (Neuhouser 2000:13, 182). Methodologically the following is 
endorsed: 
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Laws and principles have no immediate life or validity in themselves. 
The activity which puts them into operation and endows them with 
real existence has its source in the needs, impulses, inclinations, and 
passions of man.... Thus nothing can happen, nothing can be 
accomplished unless the individuals concerned can also gain 
satisfaction for themselves as particular individuals. For they have 
their own special needs, impulses, and interests which are peculiar to 
themselves (LPH 70, 12:113) 
 
The full view, however, does not prioritise individual self-satisfaction.23 There 
is a further step that Hegel describes as consciousness of freedom: 
 
Consciousness of freedom consists in the fact that the individual 
comprehends himself as person, i.e. that he apprehends himself in his 
individuality as inherently universal, as capable of abstraction from 
and renunciation of everything particular, and therefore as inherently 
infinite (LPH 144, 12:175) 
 
This consciousness of freedom gives us a historicised version of Westphal's 
moderate collectivism: that Hegel does not just describe a procedure of what 
members of societies do: they are formed by them, respond to their 
environment, and then transform it through their doings and that they do so 
using competing often conflicting conceptions of themselves and that they are 
capable of reflective and self-conscious choices- 'since man alone, as distinct 
from the animals, is a thinking being' (LPH 144, 12: 175), by which they can 
stand by, and 'own'. 
 
 
4. Incomplete individuals  
 
The previous section described some of the practical implications of Hegel's 
revision of the category of individual. The conception of individual Hegel 
preserves allows for the integration of classical and modern contents of 
individuality: the embedded value perspective directs us to a conception of 
individuals as segments of spirit, at the same time, the same logic invites us to 
confront the historical content of our conception of individuals, as desirous 
atoms seeking satisfaction unless impeded in their course, and as moral 
agents guided by universal values and aspirations. The plurality of individual 
content leaves a lot of room for negotiation between the inherited normative 
content of individuals and Hegel's positive claims regarding individuals as 
sections of spirit. This can be seen as a virtue of Hegel's political philosophy 
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because it allows us to conceptualise different meanings of individuality, 
which result in a practically dynamic conception of individuality, as members 
of specific social wholes negotiate between them. This dynamic conception, 
however, is not Hegel's final word on the matter.  
 
In the Logic, Hegel claims that the fully specified individual is 'the 
determinate determinate' (L 618, 6:296). If in reality determination is in 
accordance with the dynamic conception sketched above, then any content of 
'individual', outside the Logic, will be partial. Logical determinations attain 
their deteminateness because of the whole to which they belong. Stephen 
Houlgate explains this holistic commitment in terms of 'moments': 'a moment 
gains its character from the whole that it helps to constitute' (Houlgate 2006: 
428). Logical holism has epistemic implications, since we cannot get to grips 
with a determination or concept without having the whole in view, but we 
cannot have the whole in view from some external vantage point. So given 
some version at least of logical holism, we are confronted with a practical 
question: the determinate individual is made determinate as part of a stage or 
'moment' that is then taken up in further moments, till we reach the absolute 
Idea. This both supports the dynamic conception of individuality, merely 
adding that there is a cost, that no individual is ever completely 
individualised, and raises anew the question of perspective we encountered 
in the context of Hegel's discussion of world history. 
 
Let me explain. The dynamic, practical conception fits with and is sustained 
by a pluralistic theory of the contents of 'individual'. On the pluralistic model 
there is no finality of contents and that allows for ongoing redefinition of 
political, social, cultural identities and also friction among competing models. 
We may however take a more strongly integrationist path, than the one 
outlined in the previous section, in search of the complete, fully specified 
individual: the individual, in other words, who accepts her world and finds in 
it simply what is her own. However reflective, this would be a full 
identification with one's environment -and here there seems to be no obstacle 
in re-introducing, alongside institutions and practices, the history that makes 
one's environment, the natural landscape and so on. But then, what we are 
left with is the whole, the world-historical perspective we encountered 
previously. This too is not final, since Hegel invites us to think further, about 
'the spirit which not merely broods over history as over the waters but lives in 
it and is alone its principle of movement' (EM §549), ultimately this is to think 
-or try to think- the Idea, the für sich seiende Idee (EM §577). From this 
perspective the category of individuality itself looks provisional.  
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To the question then, how does logic and politics relate with respect to the 
notion of 'individual'?, we may answer as follows:  
 First, logic provides a detailed conceptual analysis of the term, which 
adds support to the criticisms of individualism while also providing a 
genuinely novel positive notion that fits Hegel's substantive positive claims, 
his corrective of modern individualism. 
 Second, the positive logical notion sustains a practically dynamic 
conception of individuals, which in turn shows that familiar conundrums 
about how Hegel seeks to integrate classical and modern views of social and 
political life are not intractable. 
 Third, the logical demands of determination of individuality are never 
met fully in reality; so logic does not dictate practice, it rather 
underdetermines it. 
 Fourth, the underdetermination of the practical notion of individual by 
its logical form is to be understood in a context in which the category itself is 
superable; which is also to say that the objects of philosophy exceed our social 
and political life.   
 
Katerina Deligiorgi (University of Sussex), K.Deligiorgi@sussex.ac.uk 
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1 References to Hegel's texts are given parenthetically as in text citations. After 
an abbreviation a reference is given to the page number of the translations 
given below, after a coma, a volume and page number is given to the 
Suhrkamp edition of Hegel's works, Werke in 20 Bd., E. Moldenauer and K. M. 
Michel eds., Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986. For the Philosophy of Right 
and the Encyclopedia only the paragraph numbers are given. The English 
translations and abbreviations used are:  
A: Hegel’s Aesthetics, trans., T. M. Knox, volume I Oxford: Clarendon, 1998. 
EM: Hegel's Philosophy of Mind. Part Three of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical 
Sciences (1830), trans. W. Wallace, with Zusätze trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford 
University Press, 1988. 
L: Hegel's Science of Logic, ed. H. D. Lewis, trans., A. V. Miller, Humanities 
Press: Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1991 [1969]. 
LPH: Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Introduction, trans. H. B. 
Nisbet, Cambridge University Press 1980. 
NL: Natural Law. The Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law, Its Place in Moral 
Philosophy, and Its Relation to the Positive Sciences of Law, trans. T. M. Knox. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975. 
PhS: Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller Oxford University Press, 1977. 
PR: Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox, Oxford University Press, 
1967. 
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2 See Wood 1990 and Wood 1991, Franco 1999, Neuhouser 2000, Honneth 
2010, McCumber 2014. Criticism of liberal individualism does not mean also 
outright rejection of liberalism, see Brooks 2012 and also Sayers 2007. 
Exemplifying recent trends in rehabilitating individualism in Hegel is Ross 
2008. Interestingly there is also a reverse trend, inspired by the recent 
rehabilitation of notions of collective intentionality; see Chitty 2014 
(manuscript). Traditionally the debate has centred on whether it is possible or 
indeed desirable for Hegelian objective ‘Spirit’ to accommodate individuals 
politically, socially or metaphysically. An early contribution to this 
discussion, Hartmann 1929 contains an extensive argument that seeks to 
demystify ‘Spirit’ arguing that the term does not mean 'group-mind', but 
rather, it captures just the social sphere of familiar everyday interactions; see 
too Williams 1992  and Williams 1997, Pinkard 2008, and Deligiorgi 2010.  
 
3 For this use of ‘simple’ see Russell 1992, who introduces the term in part to 
distance his views from Hegelianism. 
 
4 See Wolf 1990, esp chaps 2 and 3, on moral individualism and Skorupski 
2015 for an overview of criticisms of political individualism. 
 
5 Writing about recognition, for example, Robert Williams says that Hegel 
'struggles to formulate a theory of individuality, to do justice to the individual 
and individual freedoms ...Individuality and difference must be given their 
due without, however, reducing the social to something inherently 
oppressive' (Williams 1992:83). 
 
6 The sort of philosophical demands traditionally have been thought of as 
excessive in the Hegelian context concern the existence of a supra-individual 
spirit that manifests itself through individual thoughts and actions. The locus 
classicus of this view, in the Anglophone reception of Hegel's thought, is 
Taylor 1975. 
 
7 In both the Science of Logic (e.g. in L 581, 6:251) and in the Encyclopedia Logic, 
Hegel defines the Notion as 'the principle of freedom, the power of substance 
self-realised' (§ 160). This suggests that his aim is to move beyond a formal 
conception of the principle of unity of cognition as such. 
 
8 The discussion of Kant in this section can help us understand the ‘Idea’ 
Hegel presents here in relation to something Kant says in the first Critique, 
when Kant identifies the ‘common principle' from which the categories arise 
as 'the faculty of judgement’ (Kant 1999: A81, B107). Kant claims that a full 
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account in the sense of definition of that principle is not possible (see Kant 
1999:  A727, B755). The function the 'Idea' at this stage of the Logic then can be 
seen as a promisory note that such a full account is possible. At the same time, 
Hegel is using familiar Kantian terminology in making these claims: ‘[t]he 
pure concept [Begriff] in so far as it has its origin in the understanding alone 
(not in the pure image of sensibility), is called a notion [Notio]. A concept 
formed from notions and transcending the possibility of experience is an idea 
[Idee] or concept of reason’ (Kant 1999: A 320/B377). 
 
9 It is not my aim to adjudicate whether this is a justified criticism or not, for 
extensive treatment see Macherey 1990.  
 
10  A word of caution is perhaps apt here concerning with the well-
documented and ongoing controversy about what the precise philosophical 
task Hegel set himself when embarking on his Science of Logic, very roughly 
whether that is he is developing his own metaphysics or whether he is 
attempting to give a systematic inventory –or perhaps deduction- of 
fundamental concepts of thought; see Burbidge 2006 and Houlgate 2006, chap 
1. It is apt to raise this now, because unlike the introduction to ‘Subjective 
Logic’ with its extensive discussion of Kant’s arguments, which can be read as 
a philosophical commentary, the section on ‘The Individual’ cannot. So the 
question of what kind of philosophical genre the Logic is arises here perhaps 
more urgently. My view, the defense of which exceeds the scope of the 
present paper, is that the Logic is a kind of content logic, aiming to offer a 
systematic exposition of thought qua thought of things. Nonetheless, the sort 
of 'systematic' reading I propose (using Brooks's 2012 terminology) requires 
only that Hegel is engaging in analysis of concepts, on which all sides of this 
debate agree –whatever else they claim he is also doing whilst doing this. 
And it is this conceptual analysis of 'individual' that concerns me here.  
 
11  In Hegel's terms the advance is 'from simple determinatensesses' to 
'succeeding ones becoming ever richer and more concrete' (L 840, 6:569); he 
also describes this process as 'expansion' and also as forming 'a system of 
totality' (ibid.). 
 
12 While the influence of Geach's Fregean interpretation can be seen in Kenny 
2002, it is not uniformly accepted; see Weidemann 1986 and Wippel 2000. 	  
 
13 Geach sets himself equally against logicians who see logic as a branch of 
mathematics and against ordinary language philosophers; see Geach 1980: 8-
10. 	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14 'For Aquinas, the real distinction between a form and the self-subsistent 
individual (suppositum) whose form it is comes out in the logical distinction 
between subject and predicate' (Geach 1955: 2-3). Geach refers to self-
subsistent individuals and to individualised forms, to avoid confusion with 
the notion of individual I want to illuminate through Geach's analysis of 
form, I shall only refer to supposits and to fully specified or determined 
forms. 
 
15 As Anthony Kenny remarks, for Aquinas ‘there is not, in the world, any 
dogginess which is not the dogginess of some particular dog’ (Kenny 2002: 
180). 
 
16 Given this analysis, it makes sense that for Hegel the category of the 
individual cannot ultimately be treated in isolation from that of judgement 
with its relata, which in turn explains why the section on 'The Individual' 
immediately precedes and serves to introduce precisely the chapter on ‘The 
Judgement’. 
 
17 This use of 'positive', current in the contemporary debate, is owed to Berlin 
1969. For detailed discussion of Hegel's distinctive use of the term 'positive' 
especially in his early works from the Berne period (1793-1796), see Deligiorgi 
2012. 
 
18 Pippin's argument about what he calls 'the reciprocal dependence of the 
"inner" on the "outer"' (Pippin 2006: 136) concerns in particular the role of 
intentions, he argues that Hegel's critique of the ultimacy of individuality 
extends into an area in which 'the privileged and prior staturs of the 
individual or first-person point of view seems intuitively strongest: the 
dependence of outer manifestations of the subject's will on the inner 
intentions of that subject' (Pippin 2006: 135). 
 
19 See too Neuhouser 2000: 244f on how the state permeates non-political 
institutions.  
 
20 For detailed analysis see Neuhouser 2000:244-8	  
 
21  Brooks 2012:55-61 offers a more negative picture of what I call here 
integration arguing that Hegel treats Kant's moral theory as an example of a 
theory that treats individuals in abstraction from their communities and that 
Hegel's aim is to reject that perspective and therefore overcome the 
standpoint of morality as such. I think that this reading underestimates what I 
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see as the Kantian elements that Hegel wants to preserve and the positive 
claims he makes in the 'Morality' sections (see Deligiorgi 2016). More 
importantly, for our present puposes, the abstraction from content is itself a 
content for modern individuals, the moral standpoint is plainly available to 
them as a set of theoretical commitments well apart from anything else. 
 22 	  It is only in this historical sense, that I think the self-actualisation 
interpretation of freedom, popularised by Wood 1990 is plausible. See for 
example the discussion of property rights, in which Hegel hails the 
recognition of ‘the freedom of personality’ as a ‘universal principle’ (PR §62 
A), even while he is keen to show that abstract right is not the only form of 
right shaping human relations in the state. Further on he says; ‘in considering 
freedom, the starting point must be not individuality, the single self-
consciousness but only the essence of self-consciousness; for whether man 
knows it or not, this essence  is externally realised as a self-subsistent power 
in which single individuals are only moments’ (PR § 258 A). In his Lectures on 
Aesthetics, he writes about the liberating function of modern individualism 
which offers new opportunities for the artist who ‘acquires his subject-matter 
in himself and is the human spirit actually self-determining’ (A 607, 15: 237-8). 
See too: ‘the individual subject may of course act of himself in this or that 
matter, but still every individual, wherever he may twist or turn …does not 
appear himself as the independent, total, and at the same time individual 
living embodiment of this society, but only as a restricted member of it’ (A 
194, 14: 254-5).  	  
23  In EM §408 and Z Hegel associates such separation of the self and 
individualisation of aims and interests with insanity. He contrasts this view 
with the conception of the 'I' as 'something away and beyond' (EM §415), 
which he attributes to Kantian and Fichtean idealism. And although he seeks 
to correct this transcendent conception of the I, he also wants to keep a 
positive conception of universality that involves the 'negation of immediacy' 
(EM § 429), and so also of individuality understood as mere given segment of 
spirit. 
